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I. Introduction
In the last thirty years, the argument from the fine-tuning of the cosmos has
steadily gained in popularity, often being considered the strongest single
argument for the existence of God. One particularly important category of
fine-tuning is that of the constants of physics. The constants of physics are a
set of fundamental numbers that, when plugged into the fundamental
equations of physics, determine the basic structure of the universe. An
example of such a constant is the gravitational constant G that is part of
Newton’s law of gravity, F = GM1M2/r2. G essentially determines the
strength of gravity between two masses. If one were to double the value of
G, for instance, then the force of gravity between any two masses would
double. The “fine-tuning” of the constants of physics for life refers to the
claim that these fundamental constants of physics are set just right for life
to occur. More precisely, to say that a constant is fine-tuned for life is to
say that its life-permitting range r is very small compared to some non-
arbitrarily chosen comparison range R.
Two examples of this fine-tuning are the fine-tuning of the strength of
gravity and the fine-tuning of the cosmological constant. So far, physicists
have discovered four forces in nature — gravity, the weak force, electro-
magnetism, and the strong nuclear force that binds protons and neutrons
together in an atom. Each of these forces has its own coupling constant
that determines its strength, in analogy to the gravitational constant G.
Using one of the standard dimensionless measures of force strengths
(Barrow and Tipler, 1986, pp. 293-295), gravity is the weakest of the forces,
and the strong nuclear force is the strongest, being a factor of 1040 — or ten
thousand billion, billion, billion, billion — times stronger than gravity.
Various calculations show that the strength of each of the forces of
nature must fall into a very small life-permitting region for intelligent life
to exist, but here we will only look at the example of gravity. If we
increased the strength of gravity on earth a billionfold, for instance, the
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force of gravity would be so great that land-based organisms anywhere
near the size of human beings would be crushed. (The strength of materials
depends on the electromagnetic force via the fine-structure constant, which
would not be affected by a change in gravity.) As astrophysicist Martin
Rees notes, “In an imaginary strong gravity world, even insects would
need thick legs to support them, and no animals could get much larger.”
(Rees, 2000, p. 30). Now, the above argument assumes that the size of the
planet on which life formed would be an earth-sized planet. Could life
forms of comparable intelligence to ourselves develop on a much smaller
planet in such a strong-gravity world? The answer is no. In our strong
gravity world, a planet with a gravitational pull of a thousand times that of
earth — which would make the existence of organisms of our size very
improbable — would have a diameter of about 40 feet or 12 meters, once
again not large enough to sustain the sort of large-scale ecosystem neces-
sary for organisms like us to evolve.
Of course, a billion-fold increase in the strength of gravity is a lot, but
compared to the total range of strengths of the forces in nature (which span
a range of 1040 as we saw above), this still amounts to a fine-tuning of one
part in 1031. Indeed, other calculations show that even if we increase the
strength of gravity by only a thousandfold, no viable stars could exist that
had life-times greater than a billion years, which would seriously decrease
the likelihood of intelligent life evolving on any given earthlike planet.1
One of the most impressive and discussed cases of fine-tuning is that of
the cosmological constant, a term in Einstein’s equation of general relativity
that governs the rate at which space expands. It is estimated that unless the
cosmological constant were near zero to one part in 10120 of its “natural”
value derived from current theories in particle physics, the universe would
either expand too rapidly, or collapse too quickly, for life to develop (Guth,
1997, p. 284). To get an idea of how precise this is, it would be like throwing
a dart at the surface of the earth from the moon, and hitting a bull’s-eye one
trillionth of a trillionth of an inch in diameter, less than the size of an atom!
In light of these type of scientific findings, many theists have argued
that the fine-tuning of the cosmos strongly supports the hypothesis that the
universe was intelligently designed for life, arguing that it is highly
implausible to attribute this sort of fine-tuning to chance or to claim that it
needs no explanation. In response to this theistic or intelligent design
explanation of the fine-tuning, however, many atheists have offered an
alternative explanation, what I will call the many-universes hypothesis, but
which in the literature goes under a variety of names, such as many-worlds
hypothesis, the many-domains hypothesis, the world-ensemble hypothe-
sis, the multiuniverse hypothesis, etc. According to this hypothesis, there
are a very large — perhaps infinite — number of regions of space-time,
with the fundamental parameters of physics varying from region to region.
Of course, in the vast majority of these regions (which I will henceforth
refer to as universes) the parameters of physics would not have life-permit-
ting values. Nonetheless, in a small proportion of universes they would.
Consequently, it is no longer improbable that universes such as ours exist
that are fine-tuned for life to occur, just as it would be no surprise that
some lottery ticket turns out to be a winning number given that enough
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lottery tickets are produced.
A subtle point should immediately be noted about the many-universes
explanation of the fine-tuning. It is best thought of as not trying to explain
why our universe has life-permitting values for the constants, but rather as
attempting to render unsurprising the fact that a life-permitting universe
exists at all. To see this, note that it might be the case that the laws of
nature, along with the particular values for the constants of physics, are
part of the essence of our universe, and hence necessarily our particular
universe must have constants with these values. Any universe in a possi-
ble world with different values for the fundamental constants would not
be identical to our universe. Given this assumption, there would be no
mystery as to why our universe has life-permitting values. Nonetheless, it
would still need to be explained why a universe exists with life-permitting
values, when it seems that the vast majority “of nearby” possible universes
whose constants fall within the total comparison range R — such as the
total range of strengths of the forces of nature in the case of the gravitation-
al constant — would not have life-permitting values.
Likewise, neither the design nor many-universes hypothesis is sup-
posed to explain why we observe our universe to have life-permitting values
for the constants. This fact is explained by the weak anthropic principle: it
would be impossible for an embodied observer to exist in a universe with-
out life-permitting values for its constants, and hence of necessity all
embodied observers, including ourselves, must observe their universe to
have life-permitting values for the constants. In sum, all the many-univers-
es hypothesis is supposed to explain, or render unsurprising, is why there
exists a universe with life-permitting values for its constants.
There are two major versions of the many-universe hypothesis, what
could be called the physical or “universe-generator” versions and what could
be called metaphysical versions. In the physical or universe-generator ver-
sions, some particular real physical process is postulated that generates the
many universes, whereas in the metaphysical versions the universes are
thought to exist on their own without being generated by any physical
process. We will first focus on the physical versions.
Although a variety of physical many-universe hypotheses have also
been offered, since the early 1980’s, what could be called the inflationary
many-universe hypothesis has steadily gained popularity. This many-uni-
verses hypothesis is based in so-called inflationary cosmology, which is the
cosmological theory first proposed independently by Alan Guth and
Andrie Linde in the late 1970’s to explain the big bang and various features
of the universe, such as the large-scale uniformity of matter in space.
Despite the variety of many-universe scenarios that have been proposed,
both metaphysical and physical, the inflationary scenario is the only one
that goes beyond mere speculation. The reason is twofold. First, unlike
the other scenarios, inflationary cosmology has significant scientific evi-
dence in its favor, being widely regarded as the most viable theory of the
origin of the universe available today. Second, a many-universe scenario
naturally arises out of what are widely considered the most plausible mod-
els of inflationary cosmology, the so-called chaotic inflation models. So,
although speculative, an inflationary many-universe hypothesis deserves
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to be taken particularly seriously.2 Thus, because it is widely considered to
be by far the most physically plausible scenario, we will focus on the infla-
tionary many-universe scenario here as our example of a many-universe
generator hypothesis.
II. Inflationary Many-Universes Generator
Inflationary cosmology is a currently widely discussed cosmological the-
ory that attempts to explain the origin of the universe. Essentially, it
claims that our universe was formed by a small area of pre-space being
massively blown up by an hypothesized inflaton field, in much the same
way as a soap bubble would form in an ocean full of soap. In chaotic
inflation models — widely considered the most plausible — various
points of the pre-space are randomly blown up, forming innumerable
bubble universes. Further, because of the inflaton field, the pre-space
expands so rapidly that it becomes a never ending source of bubble uni-
verses, much as a rapidly expanding ocean full of soap would become a
never ending source of soap bubbles. Thus, inflationary cosmology can
naturally give rise to many universes.3
In order to get the initial conditions and constants of physics to vary
from universe to universe, as they must do if this scenario is going to
explain the fine-tuning, there must be a further physical “mechanism” to
allow for the variation. Such a mechanism might be given by superstring
theory (or its successor, M-theory), but it is too early to tell. Superstring
theory is currently one of the most hotly discussed hypotheses about the
fundamental structure of the physical universe (Greene, 1999, p. 214).
According to superstring theory, the ultimate constituents of matter are
strings of energy that undergo quantum vibrations in a 10 (or 11) dimen-
sional space-time, six or seven dimensions of which are “compactified” to
extremely small sizes and are hence unobservable. The shape of the com-
pactified dimensions, however, determines the modes of vibration of the
strings, and hence the types and masses of fundamental particles, along
with many characteristics of the forces between them. Thus, universes in
which compactified dimensions have different shapes will have different
constants of physics and differing lower-level laws governing the forces.
It is presently controversial whether superstring theory allows for signifi-
cant variation in the shape of the compactified dimensions. If it does, how-
ever, it is then possible that an inflationary/superstring scenario could be
constructed in which the shape of the compactified dimensions, and hence
the constants of physics, underwent enough variation from universe to
universe to explain the fine-tuning.4
Thus, it is in the realm of real physical plausibility that a viable inflation-
ary/superstring many-universes scenario could be constructed that would
account for the fine-tuning of the constants of physics. Nonetheless, it
should be noted that despite the current popularity of both inflationary
cosmology and superstring theory, both are highly speculative. For
instance, as Michio Kaku states in his recent textbook on superstring theo-
ry, “Not a shred of experimental evidence has been found to confirm . . .
superstrings” (1999, p. 17). The major attraction of string theory is its
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mathematical elegance and the fact that many physicists think that it is the
only game in town that offers significant hope of providing a truly unified
physical theory of gravitation with quantum mechanics, the two corner-
stones of modern physics (Greene, 1999, p. 214).
It should be stressed, however, that even if superstring theory or infla-
tionary cosmology turn out to be false, they have opened the door to tak-
ing the many-universes explanation of the fine-tuning as a serious physical
possibility since some other physical mechanisms could give rise to multi-
ple universes with a sufficiently large number of variations in the constants
of physics. The only way we could close this door is if we discovered that
the ultimate laws of physics did not allow either many-universes or much
variation in the constants and laws of physics among universes.
A Theistic Response to Many-Universe Generator Scenario
One major possible theistic response to the many-universe generator sce-
nario, whether of the inflationary variety or some other type, is that the
“many-universes generator” itself seems to need to be “well-designed” in
order to produce life-sustaining universes. After all, even a mundane item
like a bread machine, which only produces loaves of bread instead of uni-
verses, must be well designed as an appliance and must have the right
ingredients (flour, water, yeast, and gluten) to produce decent loaves of
bread. If this is right, then invoking some sort of many-universe generator
as an explanation of the fine-tuning only kicks the issue of design up one
level, to the question of who designed the many-universe generator.
The inflationary scenario discussed above is a good test case of this line
of reasoning. The inflationary/superstring many-universe generator can
only produce life-sustaining universes because it has the following “com-
ponents” or “mechanisms:”
1) A mechanism to supply the energy needed for the bubble universes: This
mechanism is the hypothesized inflaton field. By imparting a con-
stant energy density to empty space, as space expands the inflaton
field can act “as a reservoir of unlimited energy” for the bubbles
(Peacock, 1999, p. 26).
2) A mechanism to form the bubbles: This mechanism is Einstein’s equa-
tion of general relativity. Because of its peculiar form, Einstein’s
equation dictates that space expand at an enormous rate in the pres-
ence of a field, such as the inflaton field, that imparts a constant (and
homogenous) energy density to empty space. This causes both the
bubble universes to form and the rapid expansion of the pre-space
(the “ocean”) which keeps the bubbles from colliding.
3) A mechanism to convert the energy of inflaton field to the normal
mass/energy we find in our universe. This mechanism is Einstein’s rela-
tion of the equivalence of mass and energy combined with an
hypothesized coupling between the inflaton field and normal
mass/energy fields we find in our universe.
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4) A mechanism that allows enough variation in constants of physics among
universes: Currently, the most physically viable candidate for this
mechanism is superstring theory. As explained above, superstring
theory might allow enough variation in the variations in the constants
of physics among bubble universes to make it reasonably likely that a
fine-tuned universe would be produced.5
Without all these “components,” the many-universe generator would
almost certainly fail to produce a single life-sustaining universe. For
example, Einstein’s equation and the inflaton field harmoniously work
together to enormously inflate small regions of space while at the same
time both imparting to them the positive energy density necessary for a
universe with significant mass-energy and causing the pre-space to expand
rapidly enough to keep the bubble universes from colliding. Without
either factor, there would neither be regions of space that inflate nor would
those regions have the mass-energy necessary for a universe to exist. If, for
example, the universe obeyed Newton’s theory of gravity instead of
Einstein’s, the vacuum energy of the inflaton field would at best simply
create a gravitational attraction causing space to contract, not to expand.
In addition to the four factors listed above, the inflationary/superstring
many-universe generator could only produce universes in which highly
complex intelligent life could evolve because the right background laws
are in place. Specifically, the background laws must be such as to allow
the conversion of the mass-energy into material forms that allow for the
sort of stable complexity needed for complex intelligent life. For example,
without the principle of quantization, all electrons would be sucked into
the atomic nuclei and hence atoms would be impossible; without the Pauli-
exclusion principle, electrons would occupy the lowest atomic orbit and
hence complex and varied atoms would be impossible; without a univer-
sally attractive force between all masses, such as gravity, matter would not
be able to form sufficiently large material bodies (such as planets) for life to
develop or for long-lived stable energy sources such as stars to exist.6
In sum, even if an inflationary/superstring many-universe generator
exists, it must have just the right combination of laws and fields for the
production of life-permitting universes: if one of the components were
missing or different, such as Einstein’s equation or the Pauli-exclusion
principle, it is unlikely that any life-permitting universes could be pro-
duced. In the absence of alternative explanations, the existence of such a
system counts as evidence for design since it seems very surprising that
such a system would exist with just the right components under the
hypothesis that the universe exists as a brute fact without any explanation,
but not surprising under the theistic hypothesis.7 Thus, it does not seem
that one can completely escape the evidence of design merely by hypothe-
sizing some sort of many-universe generator.
It must be admitted, however, that if such a many-universe generator
could be verified, the sort of quantitative evidence for design based on the
fine-tuning of the constants would be eliminated. Whereas the degree of
fine-tuning of the constants could be assigned a number — such as one
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part in 1031 as we did above in the case of the gravitational constant — we
cannot provide a quantitative estimate for the degree of apparent design in
the cases mentioned above. All we can say is that if certain seemingly
highly specific sorts of laws were not in place, no life sustaining universes
could be generated. Thus, the case for design would perhaps be mitigated,
although not completely eliminated.
Finally, I should note that I am not in principle opposed to the many-
universe generator scenario, just the atheistic version of it. Indeed, the fact
that so many factors in contemporary cosmology and particle physics con-
spire together to make the above many-universe scenario viable signifi-
cantly tempts one to seriously consider a theistic version of it. This tempta-
tion is strengthened by the fact that science has progressively shown that
the visible universe is vastly larger than we once thought, with a current
estimate of some 300 billion galaxies with 300 billion stars per galaxy.
Thus, it makes sense that this trend will continue and physical reality will
be found to be much larger than a single universe. Finally, since God is
infinite and infinitely creative, it also makes sense that creation would
reflect these attributes of God, and hence that physical reality might be
much larger than one universe. One only has to think of the first chapter of
the Apostle Paul’s letter Romans in which Paul states that creation reflects
the power and eternality of God.
III. Metaphysical Many-Universes Hypotheses
As mentioned above, some have proposed what could be called a meta-
physicalmany-universe hypothesis, according to which many universes are
thought to exist without being generated by any physical process.
Typically, advocates of this view — such as the late Princeton University
philosopher David Lewis (1986) and University of Pennsylvania astro-
physicist Max Tegmark (1998, 2003) — claim that every possible world
exists. According to Lewis (1986), every possible world actually exists par-
allel to our own. Thus, for instance, there exists a reality parallel to our
own in which objects can travel faster than the speed of light. Dream up a
possible scenario, and it exists in some parallel reality, according to Lewis.
On the other hand, according to Tegmark’s hypothesis, “everything that
exists mathematically exists physically,” (1998, p. 1) by which he means
that every self-consistent mathematical structure is in one to one corre-
spondence with some physical reality (1998, 1,3). Tegmark calls this
hypothesis the “ultimate ensemble hypothesis,” and claims it explains why
there exists a universe such as ours in which the laws of nature and the
parameters of physics are life-permitting.
Both of these metaphysical many-universes hypotheses run into at least
two disadvantages compared to the theistic hypothesis. The first major dis-
advantage is what I will call the natural extrapolation problem, which arises
from the following general rule: everything else being equal, we should prefer
hypotheses for which we have independent evidence or which involve natural extrap-
olations from the (verified) causal powers of known entities. Let’s first illustrate
and support this principle, and then apply it to the case of the fine-tuning.
Most of us take the existence of certain big, fossilized bones to count as
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very strong evidence that dinosaurs existed in the past. But suppose a
dinosaur skeptic claimed that she could explain the bones by postulating a
“dinosaur-bone-producing-field” that simply materialized the bones out of
thin air. Moreover, suppose further that, to avoid objections such as that
there are no known physical laws that would allow for such a mechanism,
the dinosaur skeptic simply postulated that we have not yet discovered
these laws or detected these fields. Surely, none of us would let this skepti-
cal hypothesis deter us from inferring to the existence of dinosaurs. Why?
Because although no one has directly observed dinosaurs, we do have expe-
rience of other animals leaving behind fossilized remains, and thus the
dinosaur explanation is a natural extrapolation from our common experience.
In contrast, to explain the dinosaur bones, the dinosaur skeptic has invented
a set of physical laws, and a set of mechanisms, that are not a natural extrap-
olation from the causal powers of anything we know or experience.
In the case of the fine-tuning, we already know that minds often pro-
duce fine-tuned devices, such as Swiss watches. Postulating God — a
“supermind”— as the explanation of the fine-tuning, therefore, is a natural
extrapolation from of what we already observe minds to do. In contrast, it
is difficult to see how the metaphysical many-universes hypothesis could
be considered a natural extrapolation either from what we observe or from
the entities postulated by our well-established scientific theories.
Moreover, unlike the metaphysical many-universes hypothesis, we have
some experiential evidence for the existence of God, namely religious expe-
rience. Thus, by the above principle, we should prefer the theistic explana-
tion of the fine-tuning over the metaphysical many-universes explanation,
everything else being equal.8
To be fair to Lewis, he does not hypothesize the existence of these
many-universes to explain the fine-tuning, but as part of his overall meta-
physical project of providing a theory of what philosophers call possible
worlds. Along with most other philosophers, I think that his view is not
even close to being an adequate account of possible worlds. The above
objection, however, is not against Lewis’s or Tegmark’s views in and of
themselves; it only purports to show that unless there is some sort of inde-
pendent motivation for their views, we should prefer the theistic explana-
tion of the fine-tuning over that given by Lewis’s or Tegmark’s metaphysi-
cal many-universes hypothesis.
Second, these metaphysical hypotheses have a difficult time explaining
the stability, uniformity, and predictability of nature. To see this, consider
those possible universes like ours in which mass-energy is the fundamental
physical substance. The set of such universes will consist of every possible
four-dimensional configuration of mass-energy. Now, for any given uni-
verse, some set of mathematical equations or rules will describe its distrib-
ution of mass-energy, and thus the distribution of mass-energy in that uni-
verse can be put in one to one correspondence with some mathematical
structure. Thus, every one of these universes is real both under Lewis’s
hypothesis and under Tegmark’s hypothesis.
Now, it seems, the vast majority of such universes will have a highly
chaotic configuration of mass-energy compared to our universe. If this is
right, then a universe like ours, with a configuration of mass-energy that is
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describable by simple, fundamental laws is bound to be rare. Of course,
only universes with sufficient regularity and predictability could support
intelligent life. Thus, if we consider ourselves to be generic observers, we
should expect to find ourselves in a universe with a high degree of local
order. But, it seems, a generic observer should not expect to find itself in a
universe that is orderly throughout, since it seems there would be a much
larger proportion of universes with merely local islands of order than of
universes with a highly ordered arrangement of mass-energy throughout.
To see this, consider an analogy of a very large scrabble-board. If one were
to shake the scrabble board at random, it would be much more likely to get
an ordered, meaningful arrangement of letters in one small region, with the
arrangement on the rest of the board essentially chaotic, then for all the let-
ters on the entire board to form meaningful patterns. Or, as another analo-
gy, consider a thousand coins lined up in a row, which are then shaken at
random. Define a local island of order to be any consecutive sequence of
five coins which all are on the same side — that is, either all heads or all
tails. It is much more likely for the sequence of a thousand coin tosses to
contain one or more subsequences of five consecutive heads or tails than for
it to be all heads or all tails. Indeed, it is likely that such a sequence of coins
will have at least one such island of five consecutive heads or tails; the prob-
ability of the coins coming up all heads or all tails, however, is around one
in 1040, or one in ten thousand, billion, billion, billion, billion.
Thus it seems, under both Lewis’s and Tegmark’s hypothesis, we
should expect to find ourselves, qua generic observers, in a universe with a
very small island of order and regularity surrounded by a vast sea of
chaos. Further, even within that island, we would not expect the arrange-
ment of mass-energy to be describable by a set of simple, underlying laws,
since it is only the degree of order and regularity of the world of everyday
objects that is relevant to the formation of intelligent life. Yet as we know
from quantum mechanics and general relativity, the underlying laws of
nature are highly simple and elegant. Accordingly, not only do Lewis’s
and Tegmark’s hypothesis fail to explain the uniformity of nature, they
seem to predict just the opposite — at least for other parts of the universe.9
The problem here is very similar to that faced by Ludwig Boltzmann,
who attempted to explain the relatively low entropy of the universe — that
is, the relatively high degree of spatial order of mass-energy — by claim-
ing that it was the result a fluctuation from the normal “chaotic,” equilibri-
um state, and that a fluctuation with a high degree of order was necessary
for intelligent life. As theoretical physicist Paul Davies and many others
have pointed out in responding to Boltzmann’s view, a fluctuation “the
size of the solar system would be sufficient to ensure the existence of life on
Earth, and such a fluctuation is far more probable than one of cosmic pro-
portions” (Davies, 1974, p. 103.).
One might worry here that I have not considered the laws of nature,
which might be claimed to add some degree of order. The answer to this
worry is that the laws of nature for any given universe could be thought of
as simply the mathematical rules and equations (or the simplest set of such
rules) that describe the temporal development of the arrangement of mat-
ter and energy in that universe. Thus, since even the “chaotic” worlds will
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have some set of mathematical equations or rules that describe their devel-
opment, even if they are highly complex, they will “obey” some set of
laws. Further, every possible consistent set of laws will be represented by
some subset of these universes. The set of universes in Lewis’s and
Tegmark’s hypothesis, therefore, could be thought of as equivalent to the
set of all possible universes with mass-energy as the fundamental sub-
stance and which have some law-like structure.
Before ending, I would like to sketch a final criticism that applies to both
types of many-universes hypotheses discussed above: namely, I would
argue that neither type of many-universes hypothesis can explain the
apparent elegance and beauty of the laws of nature. Many physicists, such
as Albert Einstein, have observed that the basic laws of physics exhibit an
extraordinary degree of beauty, elegance, harmony, and ingenuity. Nobel
Prize winning physicist Steven Weinberg, for instance, devotes a whole
chapter of his book Dreams of a Final Theory (Chapter 6, “Beautiful
Theories”) explaining how the criteria of beauty and elegance are com-
monly used to guide physicists in formulating the right laws. Indeed, one
of most prominent theoretical physicists of this century, Paul Dirac, went
so far as to claim that “it is more important to have beauty in one’s equa-
tions than to have them fit experiment.” (1963, p. 47).
Now such beauty, elegance, and ingenuity make sense if the universe
was designed by God. Under the atheistic version of the many-universes
hypothesis, however, there is no reason to expect the fundamental laws to
be elegant or beautiful. Now, one could always claim that the beauty of
the laws of nature is simply a brute fact that requires no explanation. Given
that theism naturally explains these features of the laws of nature, howev-
er, the atheist must admit that theism offers a better explanation of them
than atheism, and thus that they support theism over atheism. Why?
Because a natural, non-ad hoc explanation of a phenomenon x is always
better than no explanation at all. And theism does seem to offer such a nat-
ural explanation: for example, given the Anselmian conception of God as
the greatest possible being, and hence a being with a perfect aesthetic sen-
sibility, it is not surprising that such a God would create a world of great
subtlety and beauty at a fundamental level.10
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NOTES
1. For a careful presentation of six solid cases of fine-tuning, along with a
critique of some prominent purported cases of fine-tuning, see Collins, 2003.
For a presentation of the fine-tuning argument for design, see Collins, 2002a
and Leslie,1989.
2. For a critique of inflationary cosmology, see John Earman and Jesus
Mosterin, 1999. For an accessible introduction to inflationary cosmology, see
Alan Guth, 1997. For recent experimental confirmation of inflationary cosmol-
ogy, see “Cosmology from Maxima_1, Boomerang and COBE/DMR CMB
Observations,” July 2000, at the astrophysics website,
http://arXiv.org/abs/astro_ph/0007333.
3. For a good, accessible overview of inflationary cosmology, see Guth,
1997.
4. I am indebted to Gerald Cleaver, a string theorist at Baylor University, for
helpful discussions of this issue. The sort of inflationary/superstring many-uni-
verse explanations of the fine-tuning discussed above have been suggested by a
number of authors, such as Linde, (1990, PP&IC, p. 306; 1990, IQC, p. 6) and
Greene (1999, pp. 355 - 363). To date, however, no one has adequately verified or
worked-out the physics of superstring theory or inflationary cosmology, let
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alone the combination of the two, so this scenario remains highly speculative.
5. The other leading alternatives to string theory being explored by physi-
cists, such as the currently proposed models for Grand Unified Theories
(GUTS), do not appear to allow for enough variation. The simplest and most
studied GUT, SU(5), allows for three differing sets of values for the fundamen-
tal constants of physics when the other non-SU(5) Higgs fields are neglected
(Linde, PP&IC, p. 33). Including all the other Higgs fields, the number of vari-
ations increases to perhaps several dozen (Linde, IQC, p. 6). Merely to account
for the fine-tuning of the cosmological constant, however, which is estimated
to be fine-tuned to one part in 1053, would require on the order of 1053 variations
of the physical constants among universes.
6. Although some of the lower-level laws of physics can vary from uni-
verse to universe in string theory, these background laws and principles are a
result of the structure of string theory and therefore cannot be explained by the
inflationary/superstring many-universes hypothesis since they must occur in
all universes. Further, since the variation among universes would consist of
variation of the masses and types of particles, and the form of the forces
between them, complex structures would almost certainly be atomlike and sta-
ble energy sources would almost certainly require aggregates of matter. Thus,
the above background laws seem necessary for there to be highly complex life
in any of the many universes generated in this scenario, not merely a universe
with our specific types of particles and forces.
7. The rule of inference used here is what could be called the surprise prin-
ciple. Let H1 and H2 be two competing non-ad-hoc hypotheses, which can be
roughly be thought of as hypotheses that were not constructed merely to
account for the data E in question. According to the surprise principle, if a
body of data E is less surprising under one of the hypotheses H1 than under the
other, H2, then the data E provides evidence in favor of H1 over H2. The best
way, I believe, of explicating what the notion of surprise is here is in terms of
what philosophers call conditional epistemic probability, in which case the above
principle would reduce to what is often called the likelihood principle or the prin-
ciple of relevance, which is a standard principle of probabilistic confirmation the-
ory. That is, E provides evidence for H1 over H2 if the conditional epistemic
probability of E is greater under H1 than H2, given that the epistemic probabili-
ty of H1 is not already zero.
8. Advocates of the metaphysical many-universes hypothesis often claim
that one of its virtues is that it is an extremely simple hypothesis. Since theists
claim the same thing about the theistic hypothesis, however, it is initially
unclear whether the criterion of simplicity provides a reason to prefer this
hypothesis over the theistic hypothesis, or vice versa.
9. Lewis responds to this sort of objection by first noting that since both
the class of largely chaotic possible worlds and highly ordered possible worlds
have the same cardinality, the worlds that are largely chaotic can be put into
one to one correspondence with the worlds that are highly ordered. Hence,
one cannot say that the largely chaotic worlds outnumber the ordered worlds;
at best, one could argue that there exists some natural measure over the space
of possible worlds such that highly ordered worlds turn out to be rare. Lewis
then claims that there is no objective way of placing such a measure of propor-
tion over possible worlds. (See 1986, pp. 115-123).
Although I cannot provide a detailed response to Lewis’s suggestion here, I
would claim that the above argument does not require that there exists an
objective, natural metaphysical measure over possible worlds. Rather, since
the sort of probability we are dealing with here is epistemic probability, all we
require is a natural, epistemic measure: that is, a measure induced by the way
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our epistemic faculties represent the world. Then I would go on to argue that
our epistemic faculties do represent the highly ordered worlds as being
extremely rare, indeed infinitely rare, though I do not have space to present
this argument here. The situation here is analogous to the case of tossing a six-
sided die: we can meaningfully speak of the epistemic probability of the die
landing on four as being one in six even though (i) the members of the class of
possible worlds in which the die lands on six can be put into one to one corre-
spondence with the members of the class of possible worlds in which the die
does not land on six, and (ii) there is no natural metaphysical measure over
possible worlds such that the class of worlds in which the die does not land on
four has six times the measure as the class in which the die does land on four.
The reason we can speak of the epistemic probability being one in six in this
case is that the symmetry of the die induces an epistemic measure over these
classes of worlds.
10. This argument from the beauty and elegance of the laws of nature is
presented in more detail in Collins, 2002b.
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